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    <title>EconStor Community: Fakultät III: Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht, Universität Siegen</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/249</link>
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    <title>EconStor</title>
    <url>http://www.econstor.eu/retrieve/99894</url>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/249</link>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57269">
    <title>The carbon-budget approach to climate stabilization: Costeffective subglobal versus global action</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57269</link>
    <description>Title: The carbon-budget approach to climate stabilization: Costeffective subglobal versus global action
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Scientific expertise suggests that mitigating extreme world-wide climate change damages requires avoiding increases in the world mean temperature exceeding 2ê Celsius. To achieve the two degree target, the cumulated global emissions must not exceed some limit, the so-called global carbon budget. In a two-period twocountry general equilibrium model with a finite stock of fossil fuels we compare the cooperative cost-effective policy with the unilateral cost-effective policy of restricting emissions to the global carbon budget. In its simplest form, the cost-effective global policy is shown to consist of a joint emission trading scheme in the first period (only). In sharp contrast, subglobal cost-effective regulation may require the abating country to tax its first-period consumption and to tax or subsidize its emissions in the first and/or second period.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57268">
    <title>Unilateral reduction of medium-term carbon emissions via taxing emissions and consumption</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57268</link>
    <description>Title: Unilateral reduction of medium-term carbon emissions via taxing emissions and consumption
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of non-renewable fossil-fuel resources (= world carbon emissions). Following Eichner and Pethig (2011b) we set up a two-country two-period model in which one of the countries represents a sub-global climate coalition that implements a binding ceiling on the world's first-period emissions. The other country is the rest of the world and refrains from taking action. The climate coalition has at its disposal sign-unconstrained taxes on emissions in both periods, as in Eichner and Pethig (2011b), but in the present study it has the additional option of taxing consumption. The central question is whether and how the coalition makes use of consumption taxes along with emission taxes in its unilateral cost-effective ceiling policy. We identify cost-effective policies under various conditions and find that all consist of a (positive) tax on first-period consumption and of emission taxes whose rates are negative in the second period but may take on either sign in the first period.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57267">
    <title>Incentives and the delegation of decision making power in sovereign wealth funds</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57267</link>
    <description>Title: Incentives and the delegation of decision making power in sovereign wealth funds
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Grigoryan, Artur
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher transparency. It also focuses on the role of elections as a basic mechanism to control and discipline politicians. I show that the politician has incentives for strategic behaviour if voters have incomplete information about his competence. The paper also studies when the delegation of decision making power is socially optimal and under which circumstances it takes place.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57266">
    <title>Die konsekutiven Studiengänge: Unheil oder Chance für die Betriebswirtschaftslehre?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57266</link>
    <description>Title: Die konsekutiven Studiengänge: Unheil oder Chance für die Betriebswirtschaftslehre?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Brinkmann, Gerhard</description>
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