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    <title>EconStor Community: Universität Erfurt</title>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23945">
    <title>The German Federal Court of Audit's observations of and comments on tax administration and tax compliance</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23945</link>
    <description>Title: The German Federal Court of Audit's observations of and comments on tax administration and tax compliance
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Schöbel, Enrico
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Auditing institutions, such as the German Federal Court of Audit (BRH), provide information on public revenue and public spending. The question of how to increase tax compliance has been of frequent interest. Unfortunately, information from German taxpayers? declaration behaviour (beyond the official income statistics and tax statistics) was neither systematically collected, nor otherwise made accessible for systematic research. However, the BRH selectively observes taxpayers? and tax administrators? behaviour and, on the basis of its audit experiences, comments on tax enforcement and tax compliance. Such recommendations are not just increasingly given by the BRH, but also increasingly considered in political decision making processes. Although the findings are not a representative sample of the German taxpayers? behaviour, they make up available information on tax compliance behaviour in Germany and, therefore, are worth discussing in light of modern economic theories of tax compliance. The reported facts are an appropriate foundation of case studies.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23943">
    <title>Politische Partizipation als Verbandsarbeit: Der Bund der Steuerzahler zwischen Mitgliederinteressen und Gemeinwohl</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23943</link>
    <description>Title: Politische Partizipation als Verbandsarbeit: Der Bund der Steuerzahler zwischen Mitgliederinteressen und Gemeinwohl
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Schöbel, Enrico
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In dem Beitrag werden die Entstehungshintergründe, Ziele und Interessen des Bundes der Steuerzahler (BdSt) erläutert. Anhand von Beispielen werden die Formen der Beteiligung des Verbandes am politischen Willensbildungsprozess verdeutlicht. Steuerzahler, die grundsätzlich bereit sind, ehrlich Steuern zu zahlen, haben mit der Unterstützung von einflussreichen Interessengruppen wie dem BdSt die Gelegenheit, langfristig auf die Entwicklung der Steue rgesetzgebung, Steuererhebung und Steuerverwendung einzuwirken. Zwar können aus dem Handeln eines einzelnen Verbandes keine Rückschlüsse auf die grundsätzliche Bereitschaft von Steuerpflichtigen, ehrlich Steuern zu zahlen, gezogen werden, doch kann dem BdSt vor dem Hintergrund der sozialwissenschaftlichen und ökonomischen Verbändetheorien trotz seiner stark ausgeprägten Interessenvertretung eine gewisse Gemeinwohlfunktion infolge der Ermöglichung von politischer Partizipation und infolge seines Streitens für die Verwirklichung bestimmter allgemeiner Ziele, wie bspw. die sparsame Verwendung öffentlicher Finanzmittel und die Berücksichtigung finanzpolitischer Nachhaltigkeit, nicht abgesprochen werden.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23944">
    <title>Design a contract! : A simple principal-agent problem as a classroom experiment</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23944</link>
    <description>Title: Design a contract! : A simple principal-agent problem as a classroom experiment
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We present a simple classroom principal-agent experiment that can effectively be used as a teaching device to introduce important concepts of organizational economics and contracting. In a first part, students take the role of a principal and design a contract that consists of a fixed payment and an incentive component. In the second part, students take the role of agents and decide on an effort level. The experiment can be used to introduce students to the concepts of efficiency, incentive compatibility, outside options and participation constraints, the Coase theorem, and fairness and reciprocity in contracting.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23941">
    <title>The convergence of optimization based estimators : theory and application to a GARCH-model</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23941</link>
    <description>Title: The convergence of optimization based estimators : theory and application to a GARCH-model
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Winker, Peter; Maringer, Dietmar
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The convergence of estimators, e.g. maximum likelihood estimators, for increasing sample size is well understood in many cases. However, even when the rate of convergence of the estimator is known, practical application is hampered by the fact, that the estimator cannot always be obtained at tenable computational cost. This paper combines the analysis of convergence of the estimator itself with the analysis of the convergence of stochastic optimization algorithms, e.g. threshold accepting, to the theoretical estimator. We discuss the joint convergence of estimator and algorithm in a formal framework. An application to a GARCH-model demonstrates the approach in practice by estimating actual rates of convergence through a large scale simulation study. Despite of the additional stochastic component introduced by the use of an optimization heuristic, the overall quality of the estimates turns out to be superior compared to conventional approaches.</description>
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