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    <title>EconStor Collection: CSLE Discussion Paper Series, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Universität des Saarlandes</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/206</link>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28014">
    <title>Fighting cartels: some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28014</link>
    <description>Title: Fighting cartels: some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Will, Birgit E.; Schmidtchen, Dieter
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper investigates the effectiveness of the new Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 which replaces the mandatory notification and authorization system by a legal exception system. Effectiveness is operationalized via the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 81 EC Treaty and the probabilities of type I and type II errors committed by the European Commission. We identify four different types of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria: fullcompliance, zero-compliance, positive-compliance and full-deterrence. We show that the Commission can, in principle, hit the full-compliance equilibrium, where the cartelizing firms fully obey the requirements of Art 81(3) EC Treaty and both error probabilities are zero.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28013">
    <title>Human trafficking and the effectiveness of asylum policies</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28013</link>
    <description>Title: Human trafficking and the effectiveness of asylum policies
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Monheim, Jenny
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We investigate the effects of restrictive asylum policies on the number and group composition of asylum seekers. We model the choices of refugees and traffickers about whether to migrate and to apply for asylum. Counter-intuitively, restrictive asylum policies do not lead to a reduction in the inflow of refugees or to a better selection of asylum seekers. Instead, we show that under conditions outside the control of policy makers these policies can increase the number of asylum claims and the number of refugees working in slave-like conditions and prevent some of those most in need of protection from accessing it.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28012">
    <title>The internalisation of external costs in transport: from the polluter pays to the cheapest cost avoider principle</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28012</link>
    <description>Title: The internalisation of external costs in transport: from the polluter pays to the cheapest cost avoider principle
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Schmidtchen, Dieter; Koboldt, Christian; Monheim, Jenny; Will, Birgit E.; Haas, Georg
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: The European Commission mandated the consulting firm CE Delft to develop a framework for the internalisation of external costs and to devise a number of potential internalisation scenarios for further analysis. The results of their preliminary research are published in a CE discussion paper, and the Commission is now formulating draft legislative proposals which will be subjected to a consultation of stakeholders. The present report offers a critical assessment of the above mentioned CE study, providea a theoretical examination of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the polluter pays principle and the cheapest cost avoider principle in relation to the problems arising in the road transport sector, demonstrates how the cheapest cost avoider principle can be applied in practice by providing examples of external costs in road transport, and puts forward recommendations for the appropriate principles that should guide the Commission's further activities in this area.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28011">
    <title>Strategic asylum law making in Europe: institutional locus</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28011</link>
    <description>Title: Strategic asylum law making in Europe: institutional locus
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Monheim, Jenny
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Given the background of changing institutional competencies in the European Union, we analyze the choice of asylum law standards of national and European parliaments, the Council of the European Union and codecision between the Council and the European Parliament. In a two country model we nd that the European arrangements maximize neither the welfare of the Member Countries nor the welfare of refugees. For the latter, there has been an improvement in the institutional location of asylum law making with the introduction of codecision. The current development towards a Common European Asylum System is in the interest of neither party.</description>
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