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    <title>EconStor Collection: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe, Universität Augsburg</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190</link>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70084">
    <title>The analytics of New Keynesian Phillips curves</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70084</link>
    <description>Title: The analytics of New Keynesian Phillips curves
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Maußner, Alfred
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper introduces the reader into the apparatus behind the popular New Keynesian Phillips (NKPC) curve. It derives several log-linear versions of this curve and recursive formulations of the Calvo-Yun price staggeringmodel that is behind this curve. These formulations can be used for higher-order approximations of the NKPC or for implementations that use other non-linear solution techniques, as, e.g., projection methods.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70083">
    <title>Policy diffusion in a simple Stackelberg game</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70083</link>
    <description>Title: Policy diffusion in a simple Stackelberg game
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Michaelis, Peter; Ziesemer, Thomas
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Strategic environmental policy games are usually based on simultaneous decision making and reach the conclusion that the policy choices are strategic substitutes. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the introduction of a regulatory instrument usually follows a consecutive pattern that is best described as policy diffusion. To introduce policy diffusion into to a strategic environmental policy game we transform the typical model setup into a Stackelberg game in which we analyze the policy decisions of two governments when one can commit to its choice. We find that the well-known trade-off between rent-seeking and the internalisation of negative externalities from pollution is mitigated when policy diffusion takes place.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70082">
    <title>A spatially-related note on entrepreneurship and economic growth</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70082</link>
    <description>Title: A spatially-related note on entrepreneurship and economic growth
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Klarl, Torben
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: A large and still growing body of literature suggests that entrepreneurship is of exceptional importance in explaining knowledge spillovers. Although quantifying the impact of entrepreneurial activity for economic growth is an interesting issue - particularly at the regional level - a concise formulation within a theoretical growth model is still missing. This paper in general tries to uncover the link between own- and neighbour-related regional entrepreneurial activity in innovation and regional growth within a spatial semi-endogenous growth model in the spirit of Jones (1995) reflecting recent empirical findings on entrepreneurial activity for economic growth. The paper derives an explicit solution for the transitional as well as for the balanced growth path level of ideas.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70081">
    <title>Regulation, credit risk transfer, and bank lending</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70081</link>
    <description>Title: Regulation, credit risk transfer, and bank lending
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Pausch, Thilo; Welzel, Peter
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We integrate Basel II (and III) regulations into the industrial organization approach to banking and analyze lending behavior and risk sensitivity of a risk-neutral bank. The bank is exposed to credit risk and may use credit default swaps (CDS) for hedging purposes. Regulation is found to induce the risk-neutral bank to behave in a more risk-sensitive way: Compared to a situation without regulation the optimal volume of loans decreases more as the riskiness of loans increases. CDS trading is found to interact with the former effect when regulation accepts CDS as an instrument to mitigate credit risk. Under the Substitution Approach in Basel II (and III) a risk-neutral bank will over-, fully or under-hedge its total exposure to credit risk conditional on the CDS price being downward biased, unbiased or upward biased. This interaction promotes the intention of the Basel II (and III) regulations to 'strengthen the soundness and stability of banks', since capital adequacy regulation without accounting for the risk-mitigating effect of CDS trading would stimulate a risk-neutral bank to take more extreme positions in the CDS market.</description>
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