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    <title>EconStor Collection: CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19</link>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72667">
    <title>Status Concerns as a Motive for Crime?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72667</link>
    <description>Title: Status Concerns as a Motive for Crime?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Baumann, Florian; Friehe, Tim
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper analyzes the implications of potential offenders caring about their relative status. We establish that subjects' status concerns can result in multiple-equilibrium crime rates and may modify the standard comparative-statics results regarding how the crime rate changes in response to a higher detection probability and higher sanctions. In addition, we argue that the socially optimal level of the detection probability and the sanction will often be higher when potential offenders care about their relative positions. Our analysis can be linked to one of the most important criminological theories of crime, namely strain theory.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72666">
    <title>What Drives Target2 Balances? Evidence from a Panel Analysis</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72666</link>
    <description>Title: What Drives Target2 Balances? Evidence from a Panel Analysis
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Auer, Raphael A.
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: What are the drivers of the large Target2 (T2) balances that have emerged in the European Monetary Union since the start of the financial crisis in 2007? This paper examines the extent to which the evolution of national T2 balances can be statistically associated with cross-border private capital flows and current account (CA) balances. In a quarterly panel spanning the years 1999 to 2012 and twelve countries, it is shown that while the CA and the evolution of T2 balances were unrelated until the start of the 2007 financial crisis, since then, the relation between these two variables has become statistically significant and economically sizeable. This reflects the sudden stop to private sector capital that funded CA imbalances beforehand. I next examine how different types of private capital flows have evolved over the last years and how this can be related to the evolution of T2 balances, finding some deposit flight by private customers, a substantial retrenchment of cross-border interbank lending, and also an increase of banks holdings of high-quality sovereign debt. My first conclusion from this analysis is that since T2 imbalances were caused by a sudden stop and are unlikely to grow without bounds since Euro area CA imbalances are currently diminishing at a rapid pace, there is no evidence that the institutional setup of the European Monetary Union needs to be reformed fundamentally. My second conclusion relates to how the current system transfers risks across the currency union, both in terms of risk transfer from T2 debtor to T2 creditor nations and in terms of risk transfer from the private sector to the public sector within T2 creditor nations. I evaluate existing reform proposals in the light of these risk transfers.</description>
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    <title>Has Public Insurance Gone Too Far?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72665</link>
    <description>Title: Has Public Insurance Gone Too Far?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Schuknecht, Ludger
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This study argues that insurance is a much more pervasive motive of government activity than is commonly thought; one associated with great benefits but also great risks. From the start of public social insurance in the late 19th century, social insurance has come a long way to all-inclusive modern welfare states that absorb, on average, 25% of GDP in industrialised countries. Moreover, governments today are expected to insure aggregate demand via public spending and jobs, and economic sectors  most notably the financial industry  via subsidies and bailouts. Public insurance has also spread across borders via international support programmes. All this has not only boosted government debt to historic peace-time highs, but also led to significant potential future government liabilities via social security systems and possible further national and international financial support programmes. While the distributional implications are ambivalent, the compound effects have put the sustainability of public finances and macroeconomic stability at risk in many countries. Correcting over-commitments requires ambitious and timely policy action.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72664">
    <title>What Drives Aggregate Investment?</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72664</link>
    <description>Title: What Drives Aggregate Investment?
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bachmann, Ruediger; Zorn, Peter
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Using firm-level survey data for the West German manufacturing sector, this paper revisits the technology-driven business cycle hypothesis for the case of aggregate investment. We construct a survey-based measure of technology shocks to gauge their contribution to short-run investment fluctuations. We estimate an upper bound for the contribution of technology shocks to the variance of the aggregate investment growth rate of 19 percent. The larger part of fluctuations in aggregate investment can be attributed to finance and demand shocks, which we also extract from the survey data.</description>
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