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    <title>EconStor Community: ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18</link>
    <description>Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich</description>
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    <title>EconStor</title>
    <url>http://www.econstor.eu/retrieve/97392</url>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18</link>
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    <title>The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74523</link>
    <description>Title: The Intrinsic Value of Decision Rights
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long argued that certain decision rights carry not only instrumental value but may also be valuable for their own sake. The ideas of autonomy, freedom, and liberty derive their intuitive appeal - at least partly - from an assumed positive intrinsic value of decision rights. Proving the existence of this value and measuring its size, however, is intricate. Here, we develop an experimental method capable of achieving these goals. The data reveal that - across different parameterizations - the large majority of our subjects intrinsically value decision rights beyond their instrumental benefit. The existence of an intrinsic value of decision rights helps understand the allocation of decision rights in practice, and it has implications for their optimal allocation in organizations, economic institutions, and society at large.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74522">
    <title>Working for a Good Cause</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74522</link>
    <description>Title: Working for a Good Cause
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Dur, Robert; Zoutenbier, Robin
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: A rich literature in public administration has shown that public sector employees have stronger altruistic motivations than private sector employees. Recent economic theories stress the importance of mission preferences, and predict that altruistic people sort into the public sector when they subscribe to its mission. This paper uses data from a representative survey among more than 30.000 employees from 50 countries to test this prediction. We find strong evidence for a mutually reinforcing role of altruism and mission alignment in sorting to the public sector, particularly among highly educated workers and among workers in less-developed countries.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74521">
    <title>Migration into the Welfare State: Tax and Migration Competition</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74521</link>
    <description>Title: Migration into the Welfare State: Tax and Migration Competition
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Razin, Assaf
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In this paper I provide some support to the Tiebout hypothesis. It suggests that when a group of host countries faces an upward supply of immigrants, tax competition does not indeed lead to a race to the bottom; competition may lead to higher taxes than coordination. We identify a fiscal externality (fiscal leakage) that causes tax rates (on both labor and capital), and the volume of migration (of both skill types), to be higher in the competitive regime than in the coordinated regime. If the population growth rate is positive the young are always in the majority. When raising period t payroll taxes the young voter has a tradeoff between the negative effect ( an income transfer to the old) and a general equilibrium income boosting effect on her private pension in period t+1 and the social security benefit in period t+1. Tax rate is positive if the (state variable) the capital stock is within a certain range, or zero, otherwise. Migration share of native born population is at the max if the state variable, the capital stock, is in the above mentioned range, or intermediate level, otherwise. In the case of private saving only regime, the migration share is intermediate level. Thus, migration shares in the social security-cum-private-savings regime are either the same, or is more liberal than in the private savings-only regime. A social security system effectively create an incentive, through the political-economy mechanism, for a country to bring in migrants.</description>
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  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74520">
    <title>Does Bilateral Trust Affect International Movement of Goods and Labor</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74520</link>
    <description>Title: Does Bilateral Trust Affect International Movement of Goods and Labor
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Spring, Eva; Grossmann, Volker
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Trust in the citizens of a potential partner country may affect the decision to trade with or to migrate to a foreign country. This paper employs panel data to examine the causal impact of such bilateral trust on international trade and migration patterns. We apply instrumental variables (IV) approaches that capture the exogenous variance of bilateral trust separately with eight indicators of genetic ('somatic') distance between country-pairs. These indicators work equally well at the first stage. However, second-stage results very much depend on the exact measure employed as instrument. Overall, we find little evidence that bilateral trust affects international movements of goods and labor. More generally, we highlight the potential fragility of IV estimations even when the instruments seem plausible on theoretical grounds and when standard statistical tests confirm their validity.</description>
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