<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Community: Freie Universität Berlin</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103</link>
    <description />
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74793" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74792" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74791" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74793" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
  </channel>
  
  <textInput>
    <title>The Community's search engine</title>
    <description>Search the Channel</description>
    <name>search</name>
    <link>http://www.econstor.eu/simple-search</link>
  </textInput>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74793">
    <title>Exit options and the allocation of authority</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74793</link>
    <description>Title: Exit options and the allocation of authority
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we consider exit option contracts: the party without decision rights is entitled to prematurely terminate the relation after the other party's choice. We show that under such a contract it is always optimal to assign authority to the informed and not to the uninformed party, irrespective of the parties' conflict of interest. Indeed, the first-best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74792">
    <title>Mobility of top incomes in Germany</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74792</link>
    <description>Title: Mobility of top incomes in Germany
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Jenderny, Katharina
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Mobility of top incomes matters for both the openness of the income elite and the share of total income that this group receives. It is thus an important complement information to the growing snapshot literature on top income concentration. I use microlevel panel data of German income tax files that is highly representative for top income households. Top income mobility is assessed in four dimensions: (i) its stability over time, (ii) the degree of mobility between top income fractiles, (iii) the degree of mobility between equally sized groups and mobility in ranks, both of which do not depend on fractile sizes, and (iv) mobility's impact on distributional results. Mobility in terms of annual fractile changes is high between the richest top income fractiles, which is primarily due to tiny fractile sizes. When the fractiles' sizes are controlled for, top income recipients' mobility is lower than that of lower income tax units.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74791">
    <title>Subjective evaluation versus public information</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74791</link>
    <description>Title: Subjective evaluation versus public information
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient termination (firing the agent) or third-party payments (money burning). We show that money burning is the less efficient incentive device: it is used at most in addition to firing and only if the loss from termination is small. Under an optimal contract the agent's wage may depend only on the principal's report and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation by the principal.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74793">
    <title>Exit options and the allocation of authority</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74793</link>
    <description>Title: Exit options and the allocation of authority
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we consider exit option contracts: the party without decision rights is entitled to prematurely terminate the relation after the other party's choice. We show that under such a contract it is always optimal to assign authority to the informed and not to the uninformed party, irrespective of the parties' conflict of interest. Indeed, the first-best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract.</description>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

