<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/">
  <channel>
    <title>EconStor Collection: Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Viadrina</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100</link>
    <description>Hier finden Sie Titel aus der Diskussionspapier-Serie der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder)</description>
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54739" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54738" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54737" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54737" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
  </channel>
  <textInput>
    <title>The Collection's search engine</title>
    <description>Search the Channel</description>
    <name>search</name>
    <link>http://www.econstor.eu/simple-search</link>
  </textInput>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54739">
    <title>Solidarity, responsibility and group identity</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54739</link>
    <description>Title: Solidarity, responsibility and group identity
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Costard, Jano; Bolle, Friedel
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: In the Solidarity Game (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998) lucky winners of a lottery can transfer part of their income to unlucky losers. Will losers get smaller transfers if they can be assumed to be (partly) responsible for their zero income because they have chosen riskier lotteries (Trhal and Radermacher, 2009)? Or will risk-lovers and risk-averters develop group identity feelings, leading to larger transfers within, rather than between, the groups (Chen and Li, 2009, for charitable transfers between and within otherwise defined groups)? In an experiment we find behavior to be guided by in-group favoritism. Responsibility for self-inflicted neediness does not seem to play an important role. In-group/out-group behavior is successfully described by a variant of a social utility function suggested by Cappelen et al. (2010).</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54738">
    <title>Who helps whom? Risk taking and solidarity in a virtual world experiment</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54738</link>
    <description>Title: Who helps whom? Risk taking and solidarity in a virtual world experiment
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Lübbe, Ingmar; Bolle, Friedel
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Most incomes underlie some risk, i.e. ex ante they can be regarded as a lottery ticket. In every society, the lucky winners of this lottery compensate unlucky losers (unemployed workers or bankrupt entrepreneurs) privately and/or by public insurances. Do voluntary solidarity payments depend on the amount and origin of risk of winners and losers? We differentiate between people with riskless incomes (civil servants), with low risk incomes (workers), and with high risk incomes (entrepreneurs). Some of our subjects had no choice of their risk class (civil servants and some workers), some of them had the choice to be a worker or an entrepreneur. The main stylized results are: (i) Civil servants and lucky workers with and without a choice transfer similar shares of their income to unlucky workers, but (ii) discriminate against unlucky entrepreneurs. (iii) Lucky entrepreneurs give about the same share of their income to unlucky workers as lucky workers do and (iv) do not significantly discriminate. (v) The potential solidarity payments are not an incentive for taking higher risks.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54737">
    <title>Nonlinear expectations in speculative markets: Evidence from the ECB survey of professional forecasters</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54737</link>
    <description>Title: Nonlinear expectations in speculative markets: Evidence from the ECB survey of professional forecasters
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Reitz, Stefan; Rülke, Jan-Christoph; Stadtmann, Georg
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Chartist and fundamentalist models have proven to be capable of replicating stylized facts on speculative markets. In general, this is achieved by specifying nonlinear interactions of otherwise linear asset price expectations of the respective trader groups. This paper investigates whether or not regressive and extrapolative expectations themselves exhibit significant nonlinear dynamics. The empirical results are based on a new data set from the European Central Bank Survey of Professional Forecasters on oil price expectations. In particular, we find that forecasters form destabilizing expectations in the neighborhood of the fundamental value, whereas expectations tend to be stabilizing in the presence of substantial oil price misalignment.</description>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54737">
    <title>Nonlinear expectations in speculative markets: Evidence from the ECB survey of professional forecasters</title>
    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54737</link>
    <description>Title: Nonlinear expectations in speculative markets: Evidence from the ECB survey of professional forecasters
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Authors: Reitz, Stefan; Rülke, Jan-Christoph; Stadtmann, Georg
&lt;br/&gt;
&lt;br/&gt;Abstract: Chartist and fundamentalist models have proven to be capable of replicating stylized facts on speculative markets. In general, this is achieved by specifying nonlinear interactions of otherwise linear asset price expectations of the respective trader groups. This paper investigates whether or not regressive and extrapolative expectations themselves exhibit significant nonlinear dynamics. The empirical results are based on a new data set from the European Central Bank Survey of Professional Forecasters on oil price expectations. In particular, we find that forecasters form destabilizing expectations in the neighborhood of the fundamental value, whereas expectations tend to be stabilizing in the presence of substantial oil price misalignment.</description>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>


