@techreport{Casarico2012What,
abstract = {We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {Alessandra Casarico and Giovanni Facchini and Tommaso Frattini},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {F22; J61; 330; illegal immigration; amnesties; labor market mismatch; welfare state; Illegale Einwanderung; Straffreiheit; Migrationspolitik; Arbeitsmarktflexibilit\"{a}t; Sozialstaat; OECD-Staaten},
language = {eng},
number = {3981},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {What drives immigration amnesties?},
type = {CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66875},
year = {2012}
}
