@techreport{Hildenbrand2012firm,
abstract = {Industrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms, especially when it comes to oligopoly theory. Experimental industrial organization therefore faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals firms! This experimental approach is not in line with modern industrial organization, according to which a firm's market behavior is also determined by its organizational structure. In this paper, a Stackelberg experiment is considered in order to answer the question whether framing individual decision making as organizational decision making or implementing an organizational structure is more effective in generating profit-maximizing behavior. Firms are either represented by individuals or by teams. Teams are organized according to Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) contractual view of the firm. I find that teams' quantity choices are more in line with the assumption of profit maximization than individuals' choices. Compared to individuals, teams appear to be less inequality averse.},
address = {Kiel},
author = {Andreas Hildenbrand},
copyright = {http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en},
keywords = {C72; C91; C92; D43; L13; 330; industrial organization; Stackelberg game; individual behaviour; team behaviour; framing; experimental economics},
language = {eng},
number = {2012-53},
publisher = {Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)},
title = {Is a "firm" a firm? A Stackelberg experiment},
type = {Economics Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64824},
year = {2012}
}
