@techreport{Chu2004model,
abstract = {Findings of cross-cultural psychology suggest that different approaches to rule enforcement have cultural roots. Individualist societies have established a rule of law, in which rules prevail; collectivist societies have a rule of man, which allows discretionary rule enforcement, which, in turn, is recognized as an obstacle to sustained increases in productive long-term investment in developing countries. This paper presents a model that offers a unified framework to explain rule enforcement as social optimization processes in both individualist and collectivist societies and, on this basis, highlights the essential differences between a rule of law and a rule man (i.e., between rules and discretion). The paper uses this framework to show that cross-country variations in rule enforcement are explained to a considerable extent by cultural values. The paper then uses the framework to show how the imported multi-stage rule enforcement institutions based on separation of powers in vertically-oriented collectivist societies, unlike in the individualist societies from which they originate, might not ensure as low a degree of discretion as intended. Finally, the paper uses these results to explore practical ideas that would help collectivist societies benefit from rule enforcement with low discretion.},
address = {Helsinki},
author = {Ke-young Chu},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
isbn = {929190662X},
keywords = {K00; O17; 330; rule of law; rule of man; collectivism; discretion; enforcement; individualism; institutions; rules; Rechts\"{o}konomik; Entwicklung},
language = {eng},
number = {2004/65},
publisher = {UNU-WIDER},
title = {A model of a rule of law and a rule of man: Implications for the design of institutions},
type = {Research Paper, UNU-WIDER, United Nations University (UNU)},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63370},
year = {2004}
}
