@techreport{Grimm2001price,
abstract = {The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Veronika Grimm and Frank Riedel and Elmar Wolfstetter},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D44; D45; 330; multi-unit auctions; spectrum auctions; telecommunications; industrial organization; game theory},
language = {eng},
note = {urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049639},
number = {2001,31},
publisher = {Humboldt-Universit\"{a}t},
title = {Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany},
type = {Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62770},
year = {2001}
}
