@techreport{Germano2010Concentration,
abstract = {Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize quality and content of media under different ownership structures. Assuming advertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topics sensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by all outlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentration of ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number of owners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relies on consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by the same media companies. We argue that externalities resulting from self-censorship could be empirically large.},
address = {Evanston},
author = {Fabrizio Germano and Martin Meier},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L13; L82; 330; media economics; media consolidation; media markets; advertising and commercial media bias},
language = {eng},
number = {1518},
publisher = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media},
type = {Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59681},
year = {2010}
}
