@techreport{Loeper2008Contractual,
abstract = {This paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes that local preferences are the private information of local jurisdictions. Contractual federalism is defined as a strategy-proof contract among the members of the federation supervised by a benevolent but not omniscient federal authority. We show that even if the size of the information to be elicited is minimal, the incentive compatibility constraint has a bite in terms of flexibility and welfare. Strategy-proof and efficient federal mechanisms are necessarily uniform. There exists inefficient and non-uniform strategy-proof mechanisms, but they are socially worse than non cooperative decentralization. Federal mechanisms which are neutral and robust to coalition manipulations are equivalent to voting rules on uniform policies.},
address = {Evanston},
author = {Antoine Loeper},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D71; D72; D82; H77; 330; Federalism; Asymmetric Information; Strategy-proofness; Externality; Coordination; Uniformity},
language = {eng},
number = {1521},
publisher = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {Contractual federalism and strategy-proof coordination},
type = {Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59670},
year = {2008}
}
