@techreport{Galperti2011Common,
abstract = {I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that, in contrast with mechanism design models with one informed principal, Myerson's Inscrutability Principle fails when there are many informed principals. I also find that, in contrast with common agency models with uninformed principals, the Delegation Principle (Menu Theorem) fails when principals are informed. I then focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which principals offer their mechanisms without randomizing. I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games with delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus and send cheap-talk signals. Next, I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games without delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus of direct revelation mechanisms, to which they truthfully report their types.},
address = {Evanston},
author = {Simone Galperti},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; D82; D83; D86; 330; common agency; informed principals; Inscrutability Principle; Delegation Principle; menus; signals; direct revelation mechanisms},
language = {eng},
number = {1541},
publisher = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals},
type = {Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59656},
year = {2011}
}
