@techreport{Gonzalez-Diaz2011notion,
abstract = {Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possible. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possible means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.},
address = {Evanston},
author = {Julio Gonz\'{a}lez-D\'{\i}az and Miguel A. Mel\'{e}ndez-Jim\'{e}nez},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; 330; non-cooperative game theory; equilibrium concepts; perfect bayesian; Bayes rule},
language = {eng},
number = {1446},
publisher = {Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
title = {On the notion of perfect bayesian equilibrium},
type = {Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59628},
year = {2011}
}