@techreport{Baliga2009strategy,
abstract = {Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by extremists who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist can increase the likelihood of conflict by sending messages which trigger a fear-spiral of hawkish actions. This reduces the welfare of both decision-makers. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist (pacifist) can send messages which cause one decision-maker to back down and become more dovish. This reduces his welfare but benefits the other decision-maker. The hawkish extremist is unable to manipulate the decision-makers if actions are strategic substitutes, and the pacifist is equally powerless if actions are strategic complements.},
address = {New Brunswick, NJ},
author = {Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C7; 330; global strategy; Politischer Konflikt; Politische Gewalt; Signalling; Spieltheorie; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2009,06},
publisher = {Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey},
title = {The strategy of manipulating conflict},
type = {Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59494},
year = {2009}
}
