@techreport{Carbonell-Nicolau2011Approximation,
abstract = {We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed, and compare these conditions to those considered in the related literature. We then prove existence results for a new finitistic infinite-game generalization of Selten's [17] notion of perfection, and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on the approximation theorems, relate existing notions of perfection to the new specification.},
address = {New Brunswick, NJ},
author = {Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; 330; discontinuous game; Nash equilibrium correspondence; payoff security; trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; limit-of-finite perfect equilibrium; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Nash-Gleichgewicht; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2011,28},
publisher = {Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey},
title = {Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement},
type = {Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59481},
year = {2011}
}
