@techreport{Ke2012Alliances,
abstract = {Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Changxia Ke and Kai A. Konrad and Florian Morath},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D72; D74; 330; conflict; contest; alliance; hold-up problem; experiment; Konflikt; B\"{u}ndnissystem; Sunk Costs; Test},
language = {eng},
number = {SP II 2012-104},
publisher = {WZB},
title = {Alliances in the shadow of conflict},
type = {Discussion Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin f\"{u}r Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt M\"{a}rkte und Politik: Forschungsprofessur & Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58350},
year = {2012}
}
