@techreport{Grechenig2011state,
abstract = {The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are (partly) restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection. A ban of private enforcement measures can even be beneficial in situations where there would be no private enforcement at first place because the shadow of defense has a negative impact on the investments in property rights infringements. From a legal perspective, our approach emphasizes a regulation of victim behavior as opposed to the standard approach which focuses on the regulation of criminal behavior.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Kristoffel Grechenig and Martin Kolmar},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {K42; P14; P37; P48; N40; 330; Contests; Property Rights; Enforcement; Private Protection; Law; Eigentumsrecht; Rechtsdurchsetzung; Staatsgewalt; Kriminalit\"{a}t; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2011,24},
publisher = {Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods},
title = {The state's enforcement monopoly and the private protection of property},
type = {Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57503},
year = {2011}
}
