@techreport{Tillmann2010Strategic,
abstract = {The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown that non-voters systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inflation if the favor looser policy. These findings are consistent with non-voting member following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use their forecast to influence policy deliberation.},
address = {Marburg},
author = {Peter Tillmann},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {E43; E52; 330; inflation forecast; forecast errors; monetary policy; monetary committee; Federal Reserve; Geldpolitik; Gruppenentscheidung; Inflation; Prognose; Manipulation; USA},
language = {eng},
number = {17-2010},
publisher = {Univ., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics},
title = {Strategic forecasting on the FOMC},
type = {Joint discussion paper series in economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56500},
year = {2010}
}
