@techreport{Blonski2001Prisoners,
abstract = {We find that contrary to common perception, cooperation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted prisoner's dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible, or at least questionable: for a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated by non-cooperation (according to the Harsanyi-Selten 1988 criterion). Examples include collusion equilibria in the repeated Cournot duopoly.},
address = {Stockholm},
author = {Matthias Blonski and Giancarlo Spagnolo},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; 330; Prisoner's Dilemma; Risk dominance; Repeated games; Equilibrium selection; Cooperation; Collusion; Gefangenendilemma; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {437},
publisher = {Ekonomiska Forskningsinst.},
title = {Prisoners' other dilemma},
type = {SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56161},
year = {2001}
}
