@techreport{Voorneveld2005Strategie,
abstract = {In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's inessential transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs.},
address = {Stockholm},
author = {Mark Voorneveld and Helena Fagraeus Lundstr\"{o}m},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; 330; Extensive form games; Quantal response equilibrium; Logit model; Strategic equivalence; Beschr\"{a}nkte Rationalit\"{a}t; Spieltheorie; Logit-Modell},
language = {eng},
number = {605},
publisher = {Ekonomiska Forskningsinst.},
title = {Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games},
type = {SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56126},
year = {2005}
}
