@techreport{Mayer2012Lobbying,
abstract = {This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment.},
address = {Kiel},
author = {Wolfgang Mayer and Sudesh Mujumdar},
copyright = {http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en},
keywords = {F16; H0; L1; 330; lobbying; free-rider problem; size-distribution-of-firms; world-price; labor-market-flexibility; Interessenpolitik; \"{O}konomischer Anreiz; Interessenvertretung; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Betriebsgr\"{o}\ss{}enstruktur; Au\ss{}enhandelspreis; Arbeitsmarktflexibilit\"{a}t; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2012-15},
publisher = {Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)},
title = {Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access},
type = {Economics Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55854},
year = {2012}
}
