@techreport{Matros2010Competition,
abstract = {In e-commerce, where information collection is essentially costless and geographic location of traders matters very little, fierce competition between providers of similar services is expected. We consider a model where two e-commerce intermediaries (internet shops) compete for sellers. We show that two non-identical shops may coexist in equilibrium if the population of sellers is sufficiently differentiated in their time preferences. In such an equilibrium less patient sellers choose the more popular (with a higher rate of arrival of new buyers) and more expensive shop, while more patient sellers prefer the less popular and cheaper one.},
address = {London},
author = {Alexander Matros and Andriy Zapechelnyuk},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C73; D43; D82; 330; e-commerce; intermediary; competition; listing fee; closing fee; E-Business; Informationsbeschaffung; Internet; Wettbewerb},
language = {eng},
number = {675},
publisher = {Queen Mary, Univ. of London, School of Economics and Finance},
title = {Competition of e-commerce intermediaries},
type = {Working Paper // School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55203},
year = {2010}
}
