@techreport{Karle2011Ownership,
abstract = {We study a differentiated product market in which an investor initially owns a controlling stake in one of two competing firms and may acquire a non-controlling or a controlling stake in a competitor, either directly using her own assets, or indirectly via the controlled firm. While industry profits are maximized within a symmetric two product monopoly, the investor attains this only in exceptional cases. Instead, she sometimes acquires a noncontrolling stake. Or she invests asymmetrically rather than pursuing a full takeover if she acquires a controlling one. Generally, she invests indirectly if she only wants to affect the product market outcome, and directly if acquiring shares is profitable per se.},
address = {Mannheim},
author = {Heiko Karle and Tobias J. Klein and Konrad O. Stahl},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L13; L41; 330; differentiated products; separation of ownership and control; private benefits of control; Investition; Produktdifferenzierung; Corporate Governance; Unvollkommener Markt; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {11-071},
publisher = {Zentrum f\"{u}r Europ\"{a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)},
title = {Ownership and control in a competitive industry},
type = {ZEW Discussion Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54962},
year = {2011}
}
