@techreport{Ilkilic2009Cournot,
abstract = {Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure.},
address = {Milano},
author = {Rahmi Ilkili\c{c}},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C62; C72; D85; L11; 330; Cournot Markets; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Centrality Measures},
language = {eng},
number = {32.2009},
publisher = {Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei},
title = {Cournot competition on a network of markets and firms},
type = {Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53425},
year = {2009}
}