@techreport{Moretto2009Auctioning,
abstract = {We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - lowest price to consumers vs highest concession fee, and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion are affected by the concessioning conditions.},
address = {Milano},
author = {Michele Moretto and Cesare Dosi},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L51; D44; D92; 330; Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits},
language = {eng},
number = {23.2009},
publisher = {Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei},
title = {Auctioning monopoly franchises: Award criteria and service launch requirements},
type = {Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53203},
year = {2009}
}
