@techreport{Fumagalli2009Exclusive,
abstract = {This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.},
address = {Milano},
author = {Chiara Fumagalli and Massimo Motta and Thomas R\o{}nde},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L12; L40; L42; 330; Monopolization Practices; Vertical Agreements},
language = {eng},
number = {120.2009},
publisher = {Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei},
title = {Exclusive dealing:  the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion},
type = {Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53168},
year = {2009}
}
