@inproceedings{Liang2010Quality,
abstract = {This paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs.},
address = {Halle (Saale)},
author = {Qiao Liang and George W. J. Hendrikse and Zuhui Huang},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; L22; Q13; 330; Quality; Cooperatives; Investor-Owned Firms},
language = {eng},
publisher = {Leibniz-Institut f\"{u}r Agrarentwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa (IAMO)},
series = {IAMO Forum 2010, Halle (Saale), June 16 \textendash{} 18, 2010: Institutions in Transition - Challenges for New Modes of Governance},
title = {Quality provision and governance structure variety: Pooling versus double markup},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52694},
year = {2010}
}
