@techreport{Dobbelaere2011Collective,
abstract = {We introduce collective bargaining in a static framework where the firm and its risk-neutral employees negotiate over wages in a non-binding contract setting. Our main result is the equivalence between the non-binding collective equilibrium wage-employment contract and the equilibrium contract under binding risk-neutral efficient bargaining. We also demonstrate that our non-cooperative equilibrium wages and profits coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {Sabien Dobbelaere and Roland Iwan Luttens},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C71; J51; L20; 330; collective bargaining; union; firm; bargaining power; non-binding contract; Lohnverhandlungen; Verhandlungsmacht; Kooperatives Spiel; Theorie},
language = {eng},
note = {urn:nbn:de:101:1-201104113917},
number = {5518},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {Collective bargaining under non-binding contracts},
type = {Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51942},
year = {2011}
}
