@techreport{Pickhardt2011Pareto,
abstract = {In this paper I examine the relationship between Pareto-optimality and group size in linear public goods games or experiments. In particular, I use the standard setting of homogeneous linear public goods experiments and apply a recently developed tool to identify all Pareto-optimal allocations in such settings. It turns out that under any conceivable circumstances, ceteris paribus, small groups have a higher Pareto-ratio (Pareto-optimal allocations over total allocations) than large groups. Hence, if Pareto-optimality of an allocation is a property that makes such allocations acceptable and maintainable, small groups will find is easier to provide Pareto-optimal amounts of a public good than large groups. This is a novel reasoning for Mancur Olson's claim, in particular, with respect to what he has termed inclusive goods and inclusive groups.},
address = {M\"{u}nster},
author = {Michael Pickhardt},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H41; C90; B31; 330; Olson; Pareto; public goods; Pareto-optimality; linear public goods experiments; inclusive groups},
language = {eng},
number = {48},
publisher = {CAWM},
title = {Pareto meets Olson: A note on Pareto-optimality and group size in linear public goods games},
type = {CAWM discussion paper / Centrum f\"{u}r Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung M\"{u}nster},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51369},
year = {2011}
}
