@techreport{Kratzsch2011international,
abstract = {This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation- proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.},
address = {Braunschweig},
author = {Uwe Kratzsch and Gernot Sieg and Ulrike Stegemann},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {Q54; F53; H41; 330; global warming; international agreement; weak renegotiation-proofness; Klimaschutz; Umweltabkommen; Verhandlungstheorie; Treibhausgas; Luftverunreinigung; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {11},
publisher = {Techn. Univ., Inst. f\"{u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre},
title = {An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases},
type = {Economics Department Working Paper Series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314},
year = {2011}
}
