@techreport{Sieg2009Grandfather,
abstract = {Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule.},
address = {Braunschweig},
author = {Gernot Sieg},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L93; R48; D42; 330; Airports; Grandfather rights; use-it-or-lose-it rule; airport slots},
language = {eng},
note = {urn:nbn:de:gbv:084-24464},
number = {4},
publisher = {Inst. f\"{u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre},
title = {Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots},
type = {Economics Department Working Paper Series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51313},
year = {2009}
}
