@techreport{Patel2009Social,
abstract = {In this paper we analyse the effect that na\"{\i}ve agents (those who take behavior at 'face value') have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling na\"{\i}ve inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Na\"{\i}ve agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.},
address = {Canterbury},
author = {Amrish Patel and Edward Cartwright},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; D83; Z13; 330; signalling; conformity; social norms; na\"{\i}ve beliefs; Soziale Werte; Altruismus; \"{O}ffentliches Gut; Signalling},
language = {eng},
number = {09,06},
publisher = {Univ. of Kent, School of Economics},
title = {Social norms and na\"{\i}ve beliefs},
type = {School of Economics discussion papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50592},
year = {2009}
}
