@techreport{Schob2011protection,
abstract = {Individual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced in the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and full information.},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Ronnie Sch\"{o}b and Marcel Thum},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J2; J3; H5; L5; 330; Minimum wages; unemployment; hidden information; labour market regulation},
language = {eng},
number = {2011/14},
publisher = {Freie Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.},
title = {Job protection renders minimum wages less harmful},
type = {School of Business & Economics Discussion Paper: Economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49920},
year = {2011}
}
