@techreport{Gachter2011roles,
abstract = {Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any voluntary cooperation. Further experiments show that this result is robust to two important variables: experiencing Trust contracts without any incentives and implicit incentives coming from repeated interaction. Implicit incentives have a strong positive effect on effort only under non-incentive compatible contracts.},
address = {Nottingham},
author = {Simon G\"{a}chter and Esther Kessler and Manfred K\"{o}nigstein},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C70; C90; 330; principal-agent games; gift-exchange experiments; incomplete contracts, explicit incentives; implicit incentives; repeated games; separability; experiments},
language = {eng},
number = {2011-06},
publisher = {CEDEX},
title = {The roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual compliance},
type = {CeDEx discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49675},
year = {2011}
}
