@techreport{Nosenzo2010impact,
abstract = {This study uses a three-person gift-exchange game experiment to examine the impact of pay comparisons on effort behavior. We compare effort choices made in a treatment where workers' wages are secret with effort choices made in two 'public wages' treatments. The two 'public wages' treatments differ in whether co-workers' wages are chosen by an employer, or are fixed exogenously by the experimenter. We find that pay comparison information has an overall detrimental impact on effort choices: employees respond less favorably to the wage offers made by the employer when they receive information about the wage paid to the co-worker as compared to the case where co-workers' wages are secret. These effects are particularly pronounced in the treatment where the level of the co-worker's wage is fixed exogenously.},
address = {Nottingham},
author = {Daniele Nosenzo},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C91; C92; J31; 330; social comparisons; wage comparisons; gift exchange; experiments; \"{O}konomischer Anreiz; Lohn; Vergleich; Verhalten; Test},
language = {eng},
number = {2010-03},
publisher = {CEDEX},
title = {The impact of pay comparisons on effort behavior},
type = {CeDEx discussion paper series},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49657},
year = {2010}
}
