@inproceedings{Emons2011comparative,
abstract = {Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic that we call quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Consumers do not observe quality before purchase. Under non-comparative advertising a firm signals its own quality, under comparative advertising a firm signals the quality differential. In both scenarios firms may boast at a cost. In equilibrium firms actually do so, but consumers rationally infer the true quality if firms advertise. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising.},
author = {Winand Emons and Claude Fluet},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D82; L15; M37; 330; advertising; costly state falsification; signalling},
language = {eng},
number = {D12-V3},
publisher = {ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek f\"{u}r Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft},
series = {Beitr\"{a}ge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins f\"{u}r Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft: Lektionen aus der Krise - Session: Advertising and Marketing Campaigns},
title = {Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48713},
year = {2011}
}
