@inproceedings{Rau2011Step,
abstract = {We analyze the provision of a step-level public good in an experiment. Specifically, we investigate how the order of moves and the introduction of a second step-level affects public-good provision. We find that the sequential-move game improves public-good provision and payoffs. An additional step-level does lead to higher contributions but the effect on public-good provision is ambiguous and insignificant. Based on an existing data set, we calibrate Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model of inequality aversion and find that actual behavior fits remarkably well with these predictions in a quantitative sense, but there are also two contradictions to the model's predictions.},
author = {Holger Andreas Rau and Hans-Theo Normann},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C92; D70; H41; 330; Experimental economics; sequential play; step-level public good},
language = {eng},
number = {A9-V1},
publisher = {ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek f\"{u}r Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft},
series = {Beitr\"{a}ge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins f\"{u}r Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft: Lektionen aus der Krise - Session: Experimental Economics I},
title = {Step-Level Public Goods: Experimental Evidence},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48710},
year = {2011}
}
