@inproceedings{Gall2011Markets,
abstract = {Economic institutions determine prospects for growth and development. This paper examines necessary conditions for an economy to support institutions that implement markets. Agents differ in land holdings, skill, and power. A competitive market assigns land to the skilled, not necessarily to the powerful. Therefore a market allocation needs to be robust to coalitional expropriation. In a dynamic setting, market payoffs may induce sufficient inequality in next period's endowments for markets to alternate with expropriation in a limit cycle, decreasing efficiency and amplifying macroeconomic fluctuations. Long run stability of markets is favored by higher social mobility, more initial equality, and less mismatch between demand and supply.},
address = {Kiel und Hamburg},
author = {Thomas Gall and Paolo Masella},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {E02; O43; C71; 330; Expropriation; market institutions; inequality; fluctuations; coalition formation},
language = {eng},
number = {30},
publisher = {ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek f\"{u}r Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft},
series = {Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011},
title = {Markets and Jungles},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48350},
year = {2011}
}
