@techreport{Greaker2011Incentives,
abstract = {Since governments can influence the demand for a new abatement technology through their environmental policy, they may be able to expropriate innovations in new abatement technology ex post. This suggests that incentives for environmental R&D may be lower than the incentives for market goods R&D. This in turn may be used as an argument for environmental R&D getting more public support than other R&D. In this paper we systematically compare the incentives for environmental R&D with the incentives for market goods R&D. We find that the relationship might be the opposite: When the innovator is able to commit to a licence fee before environmental policy is resolved, incentives are always higher for environmental R&D than for market goods R&D. When the government sets its policy before or simultaneously with the innovator's choice of licence fee, incentives for environmental R&D may be higher or lower than for market goods R&D.},
address = {Oslo},
author = {Mads Greaker and Michael Hoel},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {H23; O30; Q55; Q58; 330; R&D; environmental R&D; innovations; endogenous technological change; Industrielle Forschung; Umwelttechnik; Innovation; \"{O}konomischer Anreiz; Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik; Umweltpolitik; Endogener technischer Fortschritt; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2011,15},
publisher = {Dep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo},
title = {Incentives for environmental R&D},
type = {Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47349},
year = {2011}
}
