@techreport{Asheim2010Epistemically,
abstract = {This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.},
address = {Oslo},
author = {Geir B. Asheim and Max Voorneveld and J\"{o}rgen W. Weibull},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; D83; 330; Epistemic game theory; epistemic stability; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Rationales Verhalten; Lernprozess; Spieltheorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2010,01},
publisher = {Dep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo},
title = {Epistemically stable strategy sets},
type = {Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47340},
year = {2010}
}
