@techreport{Bartsch1996Enforcement,
abstract = {In providing precautionary incentives and allocating environmental risk, liability for environmental damages faces two difficulties: randomness of damages incurred and nonobservability of precautionary measures. Hence, a major obstacle in enforcing legal claims is the difficulty of proving causation. In order to alleviate the proof of causation, the German Umwelthaftungsgesetz introduces a refutable causality presumption. When imperfect information is taken into account, this conditional reversal of the burden of proof cannot ensure optimal precaution. Using a principalagent model, optimality conditions for a modified strict liability rule is derived. A specific rule for the optimal allocation of environmental damages under probabilistic causation and asymmetric information is obtained using a linear model.},
address = {Kiel},
author = {Elga Bartsch},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {D80; K32; Q20; 330; Umwelthaftung; Allokation; Anreizvertrag; Asymmetrische Information; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {755},
publisher = {Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)},
title = {Enforcement of environmental liability in the case of uncertain causality and asymmetric information},
type = {Kiel Working Papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46930},
year = {1996}
}
