@techreport{Vida2011Implementation,
abstract = {We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.},
address = {M\"{u}nchen},
author = {P\'{e}ter Vida and Francoise Forges},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C72; D70; 330; Bayesian game; cheap talk; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; pre-play communication; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Kommunikation; Gleichgewicht; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {3360},
publisher = {CESifo},
title = {Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case},
type = {CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455},
year = {2011}
}
