@techreport{Addison2010dilemma,
abstract = {The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.},
address = {Bonn},
author = {John T. Addison and Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher and Thomas Kuhn},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {J64; D82; 330; matching unemployment; public employment service; delegation problem; moral hazard; search theory; Arbeitsvermittlung; Arbeitsverwaltung; Moral Hazard; Arbeitsuche; Kooperative F\"{u}hrung; Betriebliche Budgetierung; \"{O}konomischer Anreiz; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {5170},
publisher = {IZA},
title = {The dilemma of delegating search: Budgeting in public employment services},
type = {Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46079},
year = {2010}
}
