@inproceedings{Stuhmeier2010Fixed,
abstract = {Typically, incumbent providers enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant. However, market entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage in costs over the incumbent, since they are more efficient or operate on innovative technologies, such as the voice of internet protocol (VoIP) telephony. Regulation with a supply-side asymmetry has rarely been addressed. Considering both a supply-side and a demand- side asymmetry, the present model analyzes the effects different regulation regimes. Regulation may have adverse effects on subscribers, market shares, and profits. If providers can discriminate between on-net and off-net prices, asymmetric regulation has no local effect on market shares, independent of any demand- and supply-side asymmetry. Otherwise, with reciprocal termination charges, price discrimination leads to qualitatively same effects than nondiscriminatory pricing.},
address = {Berlin},
author = {Torben St\"{u}hmeier},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {L13; L51; L96; 330; Termination charges; Interconnection; Regulation; Price Discrimination; Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)},
language = {eng},
publisher = {ITS Europe},
series = {21st European Regional ITS Conference, Copenhagen 2010},
title = {Fixed to VoIP Interconnection: Regulation with
Asymmetric Termination Costs},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44346},
year = {2010}
}
