@techreport{Haake2005support,
abstract = {We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.},
address = {Bielefeld},
author = {Claus-Jochen Haake},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C78; D40; 330; support result; object division; market; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution},
language = {eng},
note = {urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7012},
number = {366},
publisher = {Inst. of Mathematical Economics, IMW},
title = {Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets},
type = {Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43822},
year = {2005}
}
