@techreport{Pelikan2007Public,
abstract = {As governments lack the rationality-promoting selective pressures of market
competition, the standard (unbounded) rationality assumption is less legitimate in Public
Choice than in analysis of markets. This paper argues that many Public Choice problems
require recognizing that human rationality has bounds, that these differ across individuals, and
that rationality must therefore be treated as a special scarce resource, tied to individuals and
used for deciding on its own uses. This complicates resource-allocation in society, which has
to rely on institutionally shaped selection processes. But this also appears to be the only way
to produce the long-missing analytical support to the first head of J.S. Mill's criticism of
government, of which Public Choice has so far supported only the second.},
author = {Pavel Pelikan},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {P51; H10; D60; 330; unequally bounded rationality; institutions; voting; politics-as-selection; government policies; Public Choice , Beschr\"{a}nkte Rationalit\"{a}t , Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {07/2},
title = {Public Choice with Unequally Rational Individuals},
type = {Freiburg discussion papers on constitutional economics},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/4372},
year = {2007}
}
