@techreport{Mauleon2008Neumann,
abstract = {We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.},
author = {Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {C71; C78; 330; Matching Problem; von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets; Farsighted Stability; Kooperatives Spiel; Core; Matching; Spieltheorie},
language = {eng},
number = {2008,29},
publisher = {Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei},
title = {Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching},
type = {Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: CTN, Coalition theory network},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40675},
year = {2008}
}
